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This thesis will investigate the 2005 uprising in Andijan as a case study to question 
whether it was a radical Islamist revolt against a secular regime, as labeled by the government 
some scholars argued, or a reaction to years of oppression and economic strife. The state blamed 
the protestors as being radicals. However, demonstrators asserted that they were the victims of 
the government. 
The first part will examine the religious policy of the government towards deemed radical 
groups and devout Muslims with the aim of describing a general picture of Islam in Uzbekistan 
since an understanding of governance and Islam will be helpful to analyze the Andijan event.  
The second part will criticize the Andijan uprising as a case study to demonstrate whether there 
is enough evidence to call the uprising as a radical Islamist attack. 
 Therefore, I argue that the Andijan uprising, while having Islamist participants, referring 
to all protestors as radical Islamists in inaccurate. Many of those who demonstrated that day were 
local people who wanted to express their discontent with social and economic issues plaguing the 
country. Because of government paranoia against political Islam in the country, it served their 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
HT:            Hizb-ut Tahrir 
IMU:         The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
MIA:         The Ministry of Internal Affairs 
SADUM:   The Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia 




Islam is a rapidly expanding religion. After 2050, Islam is expected to be the largest 
religious group in the world.1 Even though Islam encompasses several different schools of 
thought and doctrines, (like the Sunni school has Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi’i, and Shia 
school has Ja’fari and Zaidi) the growth of Islam may cause some anxiety in the world because 
of radicalization movements. Since many radical movements operate in Central Asia, such as the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Taliban, and others, it is an important factor to consider when 
discussing revolt in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is one of the critical countries in Central Asia 
because of its crucial geographic location - close to Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and Iran 
which are important countries in the global world. Uzbekistan’s resources, like natural gas, 
lignite, coal, gold, and oil make it an important country in the region.2 Also, Uzbekistan borders 
all the other Central Asian countries. Therefore, in terms of regional organization and regional 
security, Uzbekistan is strategic.3 That is why the stability of Uzbekistan, or the safety of 
Uzbekistan, is important not only for the country itself, but also for the region and investors 
operating in the country.  
After the fall of the USSR, Uzbekistan struggled with radical Islamism and was exposed 
to several Islamist attacks in 1999 and the 2004 Tashkent Bombing.4 Later, on May 13, 2005, 
                                                 
1 Michael Lipka & Conrad Hackett, “Why Muslims are The World’s Fastest-Growing Religious Group,”April 17, 
2017 accessed July 22, 2017. 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/06/why-muslims-are-the-worlds-fastest-growing-religious-group/ 
2 “Territory and Climate,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, accessed October 22, 2017. 
https://mfa.uz/en/uzbekistan/342/   
3 Zeyno Baran, “Uzbekistan: The Key to Success in Central Asia,” The World Organization for Resource 
Development and Education, June 15, 2004 accessed December 2,2017. 
http://www.worde.org/publications/commentary/global_security/uzbekistan-the-key-to-success-in-central-asia/  
4Flippo Menga, ”Uzbekistan,” In The SAGE Encyclopedia of War: Social Science Perspectives Vol.4, Ed. Paul 
Joseph. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2017) 1786-1787. Doi:10.4135/9781483359878.n701 
 
 2 
there was an uprising in Andijan. It is not certain whether an Islamist attack instigated the 
trouble, or just an anti-government demonstration. Although the government blamed the terrorist 
group ‘Akramiya’5  as responsible for the protests, protestors argued they were innocent citizens 
who wanted to demonstrate their disenfranchisement.6 
Reports of massive human rights violations concerning religious freedom in the country 
have been rampant since the end of the Soviet Union.7 Before evaluating the events of Andijan 
and whether it was an uprising or terrorist attack against the regime, showing a picture of the 
approaches of the government to radical groups and devout Muslims from the mid 1990s will be 
helpful to understand a clear view of Islam in Uzbekistan.  
The thesis begins with a literature review that shows the different perspectives of the 
other scholars’ ideas about radical Islam, defines the meaning of radical Islam for this study, and 
evaluates different opinions of the scholars on whether the Andijan uprising was a terrorist 
attack. 
The second part of the study shows a clear picture of Islam in Uzbekistan from the mid-
1990s to today by determining the governmental approaches to Islam and its reflection to 
outstanding radical movements IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), and HT (Hizb ut-
Tahrir) and devout Muslims in Uzbekistan using secondary sources.  
The third part examines the Andijan uprising by evaluating newspapers and international 
organizations’ reports, in order to bring different perspectives together to evaluate whether it was 
a radical revolt against the regime. I collected articles from multi-language newspapers (English, 
                                                 
5 Akram Yuldashev created Akramiya after leaving from Hizb-ut-Tahrir in 1996. Since he thought that creating the 
system of a caliphate is not a realistic and Islamic state should establish locally, he left from Hizb-ut-Tahrir and 
created that group. (Dilip Hiro, Inside Central Asia: A Political and Cultural History of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Iran, (New York, NY: Overlook Duckworth, 2009) P. 188) 
6“How The Andijan Killings Unfolded,” BBC News, (17 May 2005) Accessed November 21, 2017. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4550845.stm 
7“Uzbekistan Country Profile,” BBC News, (1 November 2017) Accessed December 2, 2017. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16218112  
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Turkish, Russian) that were published during the uprising, and investigated international 
organizations’ reports. After examining these sources, the result which shows that the uprising 
was organized by an armed group. However, it does not make the uprising a Radical Islamist 
attack since the purpose of the demonstrations was not extinguish the secular regime. Also, many 



















Before evaluating the place of radical Islam in Uzbekistan, the meaning of radical Islam 
must be defined. Martha Brill Olcott stated that any activity of Muslims against the “official 
religious establishment” may be referred to as “radical” Islamism or fundamentalism8 by the 
government of Uzbekistan. Official Islamic institutes in Uzbekistan depend on the government 
and are controlled by the government. Therefore, accepting all Islamic activity as a radical 
movement if it is against the official institutes means all religious activities will be subordinate to 
the regime. Like Adeeb Khalid asserts, there is no one way of Islamic discourse in the world,9 so, 
how can accepting Islam in one way and including it in one official way be right? Also, when the 
citizens believe different than the government, might we call them as radical Islamists? If so, 
how may freedom categorize? Since there are many ways of understanding Islam, there should 
be many ways to experience it. However, In Uzbekistan, there is an official Islam, so the other 
Islamic approaches are accepted as radical Islam. This attitude of the regime makes it 
challenging to divide radicals from devout Muslims according to the state.  
Radical Islam for this thesis is defined through McGlinchey’s perspective that radical 
Islam is a movement whose aim replaces the secular regime with an Islamic regime and secular 
rules with Sharia Law (Islamic law).10 Members of the radical movements, radical Islamists, 
might prefer to use their aim with the help of armed force, or more peaceful, nonviolent action to 
create their Islamic government.11 With this concept, prominent radical groups (IMU and HT) 
will be investigated. 
                                                 
8Martha B. Olcott, The Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace), 4. accessed November 16, 2017.  
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/olcottroots.pdf   
9 Adeeb Khalid, Komunizmden Sonra Islam Orta Asya’da Din ve Politika (Istanbul: Sitare Yayinlari, 2011), 20. 
10Eric McGlinchey, “Autocrats, Islamists, and The Rise Of Radicalism in Central Asia,” Current History, 104(684) 
(2005): 336-342. P.336 http://mason.gmu.edu/~emcglinc/final_mcglin_current_history.pdf 
11 McGlinchey, Ibid, 336. 
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Emmanual Karagiannis states that HT is a social movement since it has three essential 
characteristics of social movements: “a higher degree of internal organization; typically longer 
duration, …, and the deliberate attempt to reorganize society itself.“12 Karagiannis argues that 
since HT has existed since the 1950s, the purpose of the group is to peacefully implement radical 
changes, and “the group has a pyramidal structure of command.”13 HT is a peaceful movement. 
Up to the present, there is no evidence of violent activity by HT in Central Asia. However, even 
though HT is a nonviolent movement, one of its’ aims is establishing a state based on the 
Khalifah system and Islamic rules. Therefore, eliminating the secular regime and creating an 
Islamic regime in Uzbekistan makes HT a radical movement instead of social movement. Thus, 
this study will accept HT as a radical movement.  
On May 13, 2005, there was an uprising in Andijan; however it is not known whether 
radical Islamists attacked the secular regime or demonstrated to show unrest against the 
government.   Zeyno Baran and her friends highlight that the uprising was organized by the 
Islamists, and according to some records, religious slogans were chanted during the 
demonstartion.14 Encouraging the uprising did not make the uprising an Islamist terrorist attack. 
This study does not claim there were no Islamist groups in the uprising, however, it claims that 
even though there were some Islamists in the event, many of them were ordinary citizens who 
sought a solution for their problem. Also, the aim of the Islamist group did not attack the secular 
regime, instead they sought more freedom. Slogans are essential to show the reaction of people, 
                                                 
12 Emmanuel Karagiannis, “Political Islam in Uzbekistan: Hizb-ut Tahrir Al-Islami,” Europe- Asia Studies, 58.2 
(2006). 267. Doi:10.1080/09668130500481444 
13 Karagiannis, Ibid, 267 
14 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell, “Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: 
Implications for the EU,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, Silk Road Paper (July 2006) 
37. accessed December 2, 2017. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30281/14_Islam_Radicalisim_Central_Asia.pdf  
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but most of the newspapers highlighted the slogans related to social and economic issues and 
chanting for jobs and freedom.15  
Shirin Akiner believes that the uprising was a “carefully prepared attack,” and that the 
protestors were not “peaceful civilians, but an action undertaken by armed men with some 
degree of military training.”16 Also, ahe argued that the number of people killed is not like the 
media indicated with more than 1000, but is closer to the government stated which was under the 
200 people, and she expressed the media dates had confused her.17 While international media did 
not have an opportunity to investigate the event deeply because of the restrictions by the 
government, Akiner had access to the field with the help of officials in Andijan, which reduced 
her objectivity.18 Instead of governmental sources, independent media and international reports 
are more reliable.   
Adeeb Khalid highlights the arrest of a successful religious businessmen and believes the 
regime saw the businessman as a competitor of its regime since they had social power and the 
ability to mobilize.19  Since Uzbekistan has had authoritarian tendencies,20 the government sees 






                                                 
15 Nerdun Hacioglu, “Halk da Ayaklandi,” Hurriyet, (15 May 2005) 14. 
16 Shirin Akiner, “Violence in Andijan, 13 May 2005: An Independent Assesment,” Central Asia- Caucasus 
Institute Silk Road Studies Program, Silk Road Paper (July 2005) 30. Accessed December 3, 2017. 
https://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/2005_akiner_violence-in-andijan-13-may-2005.pdf  
17 Akiner, Violence in Andijan, 10. 
18 Khalid, Ibid, 209. 
19 Khalid, Ibid, 208. 
20BBC News, “Uzbekistan Country Profile”.  
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Methodology 
The first section of this study used secondary reports and books to illustrate how the 
Uzbek government relates to religion since the fall of the Soviet Union. Outstanding regional 
books and articles were selected according to the Islam discourse in the Soviet Period and after. 
Also, to indicate the position of the government in relation to its citizens, the constitution of 
Uzbekistan and its laws, in combination with international organization’s reports related to 
human rights and radical movements from 1991 to 2017 were evaluated.  
For the second part of the thesis, the critical case studyof the Andijan uprising is 
investigated because it was noted as being the biggest and bloodiest uprising after 1991 in 
Uzbekistan.21 Newspapers published within one month after the uprising were collected. Firstly, 
the articles related to the uprising were selected and I investigated how the event happened and 
how the newspapers reported on the events. Russian, American and Turkish newspapers were 
studied. Since American and Russian journals come to the forefront on the global level, they 
were investigated. Also, because Turkey is a secular Islamic country like Uzbekistan, Turkish 
newspapers were used to gain a different viewpoint in the research.  
I employ methods within the document analysis approach to systematically code key 
themes and issues across the documents gathered. This approach relies on systematic content 





                                                 
21 Mansur Mirovalev, “Uzbekistan: 10 years after the Andijan massacre”, Al Jazeera, (12 May 2015) Accessed 
December 2, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/05/150511123115026.html  
 8 
Islam in Uzbekistan 
During the 1920s (Soviet Period), it was a tough time for the religious community. A lot 
of mosques were closed and converted to museums or storage facilities by the Soviet regime. 
Some Muslims were arrested and some of them were executed, Muslim women had to remove 
their veils, the wealth of the Waqfs (religious organizations) was seized,22 religious schools 
(madrasas) closed, and many ulama (educated Muslim groups) were banished, captured, or 
killed.23 Thus, Islam had to live underground during this term.24 
In 1943, the Soviet Regime created SADUM (The Spiritual Administration of the 
Muslims of Central Asia).25 All Islamic activities such as registering mosques, deciding concepts 
of Friday sermons, publishing books were controlled with the help of this Islamic Institution 
which is equivalent to the Muftiate system in Uzbekistan today.26 Even though the USSR 
collapsed, the system of SADUM remained with the name of the Muftiate system, and  was 
allowed to create an official Islam in Uzbekistan after the Soviet collapse. Creating a state Islam 
resulted in all the other Islamic figures, activities, and movements being made illegal in 
Uzbekistan.  
During the 1990s, Uzbekistan was a stable country compared to its neighbors Tajikistan and 
Afghanistan because of its authoritarian structure.27 During this term, fundamentalists groups 
                                                 
22 James Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic’s Road to Sovereignity (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1991), 174.  




24 Critchlow, Ibid, 174. 
25 Olcott, Ibid, 9.  
26 Abu Sad Aijaz. “Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan,” International Journal of Humanities& Social Science 
Studies(IJHSSS), no:2 (3) (2015): 272- 276. P.273 http://www.ijhsss.com/files/Abu-Sad-Aijaz_730ch2km.pdf   
27 Khalid, Ibid, 169.  
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lived secretly or departed from Uzbekistan.28 At the end of the 1990s, two radical groups which 
challenged the present regime arose. The main aim of the groups (HT and IMU) was to create an 
Islamic based government, and the main differences between them were their method to establish 
an Islamic state. While IMU has been able to apply violence to get their results, HT has preferred 
the pacifist route. Thus, after 1998, struggling with the fundamentalists has been one of the 
primary purposes of the government.29 
On May 1, 1998, the Republic of Uzbekistan created on a law ‘Freedom of Conscience 
and Religious Organizations.’ According to this law, the government guaranteed practicing or 
not practicing a religion, and without looking at the citizens’ religious leanings, all citizens have 
equal rights under the law. Also, religion and the state are separated from each other so, it can be 
seen that Uzbekistan is a secular country. Creating political parties and social movements are 
banned if they are based on religion. Education and religion also are separated from each other; 
there is no possibility to include religion into the educational curriculum. The Uzbekistan law 
indicates that religious organizations are based on voluntariness, and they must register with the 
Ministry of Justice or the local agencies. To create an organization, at least a hundred citizens 
must gather.30 Thus, many mosques are closed due to lack of attendees. While there were more 
than 5,000 mosques in Uzbekistan before the law, in 2003, for instance, there were just 1,800 
mosques remaining.31 In 2015, there are 2,064 mosques, Islamic centers, and educational 
institutions registered.32  
                                                 
28 Ollcatt, Ibid, 52. 
29 Khalid, Ibid, 169.  
30 “Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations (1998, May 1). Article 3,4,5,7,8.” Legislationline, accessed 
October 27, 2017. http://legislationline.org/topics/country/55/topic/78 
31 ICG Asia Report. “Central Asia: Islam and The State.” International Crisis Group, No.59. (Osh/Brussel, 10 July 
2003) 6. accessed October 24, 2017. https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/59-central-asia-islam-and-the-state.pdf  
32 “Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 -
Uzbekistan-.” U.S. Department of State. (2016) 4. accessed October 25, 2017. 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2016&dlid=265554 
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If the young generations want to learn religion, according to law, after secondary school, they 
might begin religious education at religious educational institutions which register with the 
Ministry of Justice and provide necessary licensing. Learning religion in private is banned.33 
There are only two religious institutions of higher education which are the Tashkent Islamic 
Institute and the Tashkent Islamic University. Besides these two, there are ten Madrasas offering 
two-year training.34 Therefore, it is apparent that there are not many spaces to learn religion from 
a faith based perspective. Registration is also a significant problem in the country. 
Looking at the law of Uzbekistan regarding religion, except for the Ministers of Religion, 
wearing religious dress in public places is banned.35 A Turkish newspaper indicates that the chief 
physician Zuhra Najimova signed a letter which shows wearing a hijab in the service is not 
allowed. Women who did not want to sign the letter were fired.36 Also, the news indicated that 
tarawih prayer is banned in the mosques for the students. Although religious freedom was 
guaranteed by the law, there is clearly a restriction of Islam in Uzbekistan. If the Islam is a 
culture or custom in Uzbekistan, it would not cause a problem for the government. However, it 
can be seen that there are some restrictions on the practice of Islam. This attitude of the 
government might cause the rise of the radical movements and their supporters. Some citizens of 
Uzbekistan want to learn about their religion. However, because of the government restrictions, 
they do not have enough legal places to get it. The restrictions may result in people learning 
religion illegally, becoming a supporter of radical movements, or at least having a sympathy for 
these actions. There is some result of this delinquency.  
                                                 
33 Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, Article 9.  
34 ICG Asia Report, Islam and The State, 8. 
35 Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, Article 14. 
36 “Ozbekistan’da Islam’a Yasak Ustune Yasak,” Sabah, September 26, 2015. Accessed Oztober 26, 2017. 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/dunya/2015/09/26/ozbekistanda-islama-yasak-ustune-yasak   
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In the criminal code of Uzbekistan, the punishments are detailed for those who breaks the 
rule. For instance, the establishment of illegal religious organizations may be punished from six 
months to five years in prison.37 If any citizen helps or supports radical movements, such as the 
IMU, they might be arrested for eight to ten years in the best-case scenario, and years of 
imprisonment might change according to crime, potentially rising to twenty years or even capital 
punishment.38 
The Uzbek government has described extremist religious groups as a potential threat to the 
security and stability of the country.39 Hizb-ut Tahrir is one of the members of these extremist 
groups.  
Hizb ut-Tahrir 
According to Hizb ut –Tahrir’s official website, it is an Islamic party whose aim is to 
create an Islamic Khalifah state based on Sharia. Having different Islamic viewpoints for the 
Ummah such as belonging to different schools or having different nationalities do not matter for 
them.  They have divided the world into two parts: “Dar al-Kufr (Land of disbelief)” and “Dar 
al-Islam (land of Islam).” In that division, it does not mean occupant of the land should be 
Muslim; the group is based on whose rules are enforced in the territories. In this regard, they 
believe that all Islamic lands are under the control of Dar al-Kufr which needs to change. For this 
purpose, Hizb ut-Tahrir arose in 1952 in Al-Quds.40  
HT started its activity in Uzbekistan during the middle of the 1990s. There are some 
specific reasons why the people in Central Asia have joined the group. The social-economic 
conditions of Central Asia is one of the main reasons. Some members of HT denied joining the 
                                                 
37 “Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan. (1994, amended 2002). Article 216,” Legislationline, Accessed 
October 27, 2017. http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/country/55  
38 Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Article 155.  
39 U.S. Department of State, Uzbekistan 2016, 6.  
40 “Hizb ut Tahrir”, Hizb-ut Tahrir, accessed November 1, 2017. http://english.hizbuttahrir.org/about/about-us  
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HT because of the economic shortcomings to show their professional, affluent western members 
as proof. However, in the case of Central Asia, it looks like some of them have been expecting 
financial support from the movement.41 However, there is no substantial evidence about that. 
One of the member’s wife indicated that only the jobless younger generation joins the group, 
supporting for financial compensation.42 Also, habitants who do not have any expectation for 
their future and have a desire to make something for their society have joined HT.43  
One of the differences of HT from the other Islamist groups is its perspective on violence. 
There is no proof of their involvement in violence across Central Asia. They have preferred to 
achieve their goals in a peaceful way through nonviolence and propaganda.44 
The relationship between the government and HT began after 1997. Since the members 
of HT were engaged in their activities mostly in the Ferghana Valley and Tashkent, arrests were 
usually in these regions. Especially, after the attempt of the assassination of Karimov in 1999, 
the Uzbek government accused ‘Islamist terrorists’ of this attempt and started to arrest them 
dramatically. According to party’s allegation, the government arrested more than 8,000 members 
of the HT.45 After the 9/11 attacks in the US, the approach of the government towards the 
Islamic groups changed dramatically yet again. Arrests and repressions intensified.46 4,200 
members of HT were living in prison in 2002 as reported by the Uzbek security services.47 
Besides torture by the police and the security services, their condition was worse than an 
                                                 
41 ICG Asia Report. (2003, June 30). “Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb Ut-Tahrir,” International 
Crisis Group, no.58. (Osh/Brussels, 30 June 2003) 14. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-
asia/uzbekistan/radical-islam-central-asia-responding-hizb-ut-tahrir  
42 ICG Asia Report, Radical Islam in Central Asia, 15. 
43 ICG Asia Report, Radical Islam in Central Asia, 14.  
44 ICG Asia Report, Radical Islam in Central Asia, 7.  
45 ICG Asia Report, Radical Islam in Central Asia, 33. 
46 ICG Asia Briefing Paper, “The IMU and The Hizb Ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign,” 
International Crisis Group, (Osh/Brussel, 30 January 2002) 4. accessed October 23, 2017. 
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/the-imu-and-the-hizb-ut-tahrir-implications-of-the-afghanistan-campaign.pdf  
47 ICG Asia Report, Radical Islam in Central Asia, 33.  
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ordinary prisoner in jail, with occasional limits and restriction of food and water.48 Besides 
suffering from torture and persecution, religious prisoners were beaten, raped, and killed. Human 
Rights Watch indicated some reports which show the condition of religious prisoners in jail. 
Prisoners Muzafar Avazov and Husnidin Alimov, for example, died at the Jaslyk prison. 60-70 
percent of Avazov’s body was covered in burns, had massive bruising on some parts of his body, 
and no fingernails in his hands.49 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
The other radical movement in Uzbekistan is IMU which was created in roughly 1966 
during the Soviet period by  Jumabai Khojiev and Tahir Yoldashev and has continued today.50 
They had a jihadist approach and wanted to create an Islamic State in Uzbekistan.51 The US 
declared IMU as a terrorist organization,52 and since the IMU had a relationship to the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda and used Afghanistan for their operations, most of them were killed, including 
Juma Namangani53 by the United States military forces in Afghanistan.54 After the death of one 
of the leaders, Juma Namangani, the other members of IMU went to South Waziristan in 
Pakistan. There has been little to no information beyond this.55  
                                                 
48 ICG Asia Report, Radical Islam in Central Asia, 34. 
49 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, “Religious Persecution of Independent Muslims in Uzbekistan from 
September 2001 to July 2002,” Human Rights Watch, (20 August 2002) accessed November 2, 2017. 
http://pantheon.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/eca/uzbek-aug/uzbek-brief0820.pdf  
50Shirin Akiner, “Islam: Islam in Central Asia.” In Encyclopedia of Religion, 2nd Ed., Ed. Lindsay Jones, 4620-
4630. Vol.7. (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005), 4628.  
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=GVRL&sw=w&u=uiuc_uc&v=2.1&id=GALE%7CCX3424501555&it=r&asid=
6d49ebb9453a66497be1a466b1e582a0#  
51Hiro, Inside Central Asia, 165. 
52 McGlinchey, Autocrats, 337. 
53McGlinchey, Autocrats, 337.  
54 ICG Asia Briefing Paper, The IMU, 1-2. 
55 ICG Asia Briefing, “Uzbekistan: Stagnation and Uncertainty,” International Crisis Group, No.67. 
(Bishkek/Brussels, 22 August 2007) 11. accessed November 5, 2017. https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b67-
uzbekistan-stagnation-and-uncertainty.pdf  
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In recent years, IMU has developed prominent relationship with ISIS. In 2015, IMU 
declared its loyalty to ISIS.56 According to news, IMU will be a part of the ‘Khorasan Province,’ 
which includes Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, betrayal of IMU to Taliban caused the death 
of some IMU members and the leader Usman Ghazi.57 It shows IMU exists but probably was 
weakened because there is no a significant proof that shows the IMU’s influence in Uzbekistan. 
The most important thing of this event is the power of Taliban. However, it is not the subject of 
this study.  
Although at present, there is no hazard of the fundamentalism in Uzbekistan, why has the 
threat of Islam been significant for the government? After the USSR, like all Central Asian 
countries, Uzbekistan was not able to create stability in their country, especially economically 
and socially. For this reason, the government has needed to find an excuse for their failure. The 
threat of Islamism is a perfect scapegoat for them. Also, thanks to that danger, the government 
maintains its authoritarian regime.58 
Muftiate System and Being Devout Muslim in Uzbekistan  
The muftiate system (Muslim Spiritual Board) was created to control Islam and its 
activity. The muftiate system was the successor of the SADUM. It is a central factor of the  
control of Islam in Uzbekistan.59 The muftiate is based on a hierarchical system. The Cabinet of 
Minister is the first place and controls the muftiate. Muftiate is not independent, and imams are 
controlled by the muftiate. They are not only managing imams but also, imams’ khutbahs. 
Sometimes, they declare official fatwas. It is prohibited for an imam to deliver their own 
                                                 
56 “Ozbekistan Islami Hareketi ISID’e Bagliligini Acikladi,“ BBC, (August 7, 2015). Accessed October 30, 2017. 
http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/08/150807_isid_ozbekistan   
57Jacob Zenn, “The IMU is Extinct: What next for Central Asia’s Jihad,” Central Asia-Caucasus Silk Road Studies 
Program, ( 3 May 2016) accessed December 2, 2017.  https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-
articles/item/13357-the-imu-is-extinct-what-new-for-central-asias-jihadis?.html  
58 ICG Asia Report, Radical Islam in Central Asia, 33.  
59 McGlinchey, Autocrats, 337. 
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khutbah.60 Occasionally, some imams give speeches ingenuously. Believers mostly prefer to go 
the mosques where independent imams are.61 In brief, the muftiate is a crucial element to 
supervise the mosques and religious institutes.62 
Most imams were loyal to this muftiate system and the Karimov regime since they did not 
want trouble with the government. However, some of them preferred to be free. For example, 
Rustam Klichev and his followers. Rustam was appointed as an Imam of the Nava mosque in 
2000 after that his popularity was growing day by day. He always advised his followers not to 
join the radical Islamic groups like Hizb-ut Tahrir, but he was arrested as a member of a 
fundamentalist group and indicated him to return traditional Islam.63  According to his 
supporters, he was arrested because he did not make his Friday sermons which were coming 
from the Spiritual Board, and he was a self-reliant Imam.64  
After Klichev was imprisoned, some of his followers went to Tashkent to protest that one 
of his supporters named Tulkin, a journalist, was suffering from government sanctions like 
others. The police often arrested him, and watched his family home and warned them not to have 
a relationship with the radical Islamists. His wife Tahmina was not pleased with her husband’s 
preference.65  
Uzbekistan’s well-known spiritual leader Sheikh Mukhammad Sodyk Mukhammad 
Yusuf criticized the government’s constraint of Islam. He indicated that 90 percent of the 
population is Sunni Muslim, but they do not have accessibility to religious materials. Since they 
do not know what Islam is and how the behavior of Muslim should be, they are easily persuaded 
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62 Olcott, Ibid, 4. 
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by radical movements such as Hizb-ut Tahrir. He expressed that although members of Hizb-ut 
Tahrir in jail, they published a magazine, fifty books, and distributed leaflets. However, the 
officials of Religious Affairs neither published nor translated even one book.66 
In fact, the limitations of accessibility of Islamic materials continued in 2015. Still, some 
people who want to import or publish Islamic documents without getting official permission are 
arrested and accepted as extremists. However, minorities highlighted the difficulties of 
registering and getting permission for religious activities.67 Only the muftiate, Tashkent Islamic 
University, and Tashkent Islamic Institute may publish, import or distribute religious material. 
Also, children and teenagers who are under 16 years old are not allowed to practice religion.68 
Currently there is a department of Struggle with Terrorism and Religious Extremism is 
responsible for controlling religion which is a subsidiary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(MIA) in Uzbekistan. Mostly they are interested in higher level circumstances. Polices are the 
focus of the primary level cases.69  In Uzbekistan, some officials are called posbon, every 
mahalla has one or more. Their duties are a report of the suspicious activity in their mahalla. 
However, this job is suitable for manipulations. There are some examples which show how the 
posbon use their duty for bribery, or call the officers immediately, unsure of whether that people 
are terrorists or only devout Muslims.70  Corruption of security forces causes citizens unrest, also 
may affect being a sympathizer of the radical movements. An ICG interview with an imam in 
Tashkent shows the possible emergence of the future and displays the people expectation from 
the government:  
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“If the negative tendencies in our society do not stop, and corruption, unemployment 
continues to grow, and the police continue to terrorize people, then in the place of state organs, 
underground anti-state structures will begin to emerge. This will happen not today, but when 
young people, who have passed through underground education in the humiliating conditions of 
suppression of Islam, and children, whose fathers sit in prison, mature politically. Then an 
explosive situation will arise.”71 
 
Therefore, the government should do something about not only the corruption problem, but 
also, accessibility problems to religious materials. In addition, the differences between being an 
Islamist or being a devout Muslim should be considered. There are some examples of the life of 
Muslim society in Uzbekistan in 2004 that show its difficulties. Botir, who has a beard and 
religious knowledge, has lived in Dungar in Ferghana Valley. Since he is both educated and a 
spiritual person, the local police always watch him. Especially after 2004 Tashkent bombing, his 
home was searched to find evidence related to that attack. Botir was lucky because there was no 
evidence to insinuate guilt or a connection. However, Botir’s friend wasn’t as lucky. In his 
friend’s case, the police found a Kalashnikov cartridge in his home, which makes him Islamic 
militant.72 This story indicates the difficulties the life of devout Muslims or those who have a 
beards or wear a hijab in Uzbekistan.  
Similarly, Nodira’s story is also interesting. Nodira is from Uzbekistan. Her husband was 
a drug distributor. While he was in prison, Nodira found religion and joined Islamic meetings 
like reading Quran and learning Arabic. Since she is wearing the hijab, the officials of Mahalla 
beset her.73  
The headscarf and the beard are dangerous for a society who does not want to have 
trouble with the government because these symbols are seen as an extremist or radical symbol of 
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Islam by the government. Due to these symbols, people might be arrested, and charged with 
being a fundamentalist. 
Therefore, Islam has two different aspects in Uzbekistan. Based on a legal level, it is 
controlled by the muftiate and, all the others. ‘Parallel’ Islam has a lot of different ways such as 
practicing Islam in illegal places, joining the Islamic groups like HT, and violent actions against 
the regime.74 However, being a devout Muslim and being a radical Islamist are different 
phenomena.  
On the other hand, there is a pressure by the government towards religion and there is not 
freedom to publish religious books, so this pressure may encourage the public to join or become 
a supporter of the radical movements.  
The pressure of the regime and economic-social problems may cause some protest in 
Uzbekistan like it did in the past. On 13 May 2005, there was an uprising forced by Islamists but 
based on the local citizens who sought to respond to their problems. Some scholars and the 
regime viewed the protestors as radicals, however looking at the international reports and 
newspapers which were published during the event shows although there were Islamists in the 
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Andijan: A Critical Case Study 
On May 13, 2005, in the city of Andijan in Uzbekistan witnessed an uprising that would 
change the trajectory of its governance towards Islam. The government blamed the terrorist 
group “Akramiya” as responsible for the protest. However, protestors argued they were innocent 
citizens who wanted to show their unrest towards the state.75 Although the uprising started on 
May 13th, it occurred because of some disturbances. 
First of all, the process of the uprising will be evaluated. The event will be studied with 
the help of newspapers which were published during the event, and international organizations 
reports (International Crisis Groups, Human Rights Watch, Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights, and Institutes for War & Peace Reporting) related to the uprising, rather than 
state media or reports. The newspapers not only investigated what happened in the square, they 
also focused on what journalists, and other countries bureaucrats’ speeches about the uprising 
with the aim of bringing a different perspective to the event.  
The Background of the Andijan 2005 Event 
In June 2004, 23 businessmen were arrested with the suspicion of being members of 
“Islamic Charitable Organization,” subbed “Akramia” by the state.76 The regime also argued that 
the businessmen had a relationship with the HT.77  Bakhrom Shakirov, who was the father of one 
of the businessman, gave some information to the organization. He argued that they were not an 
underground organization, but rather the businessman were devout Muslims and they created a 
fund to help each other for their financial problems and charitable organizations such as helping 
their employees and funding schools. He believed that since the businessmen became famous for 
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their charitable works using Islamic economics, the government saw them “as ideological 
competitors.”78 The businessmen’s companies were well-known in Andijan because they helped 
their employees by giving them free meals, paying their wages on-time, and helping their 
medical expenses and also helped orphanages, schools, nursing home, and poor households.79 
The trial of the businessmen started on February 11, 2005.80 From that time to mid-May, 
the authorities did not intervene in a silent protest of the businessmen’s friends and family.81 On 
May 12, people were expecting to learn the verdict of the judge. Since it was deferred again, 
disappointment caused an attack on the prison due to the extended delays from arrest to trial to 
verdict.82 On the night of May 12-13, an unknown group of people attacked the military to get 
Kalashnikovs in Andijan.83 After that, some unknown group of people attacked the Andijan 
prison to rescue the businessmen and other convicts (many of them were arrested because of 
being fundamentalists).84  Unknown armed people talked to the prisoners about organizing a 
meeting in Babur Square. About twenty of businessmen joined them to go to the square.85 
Andijan Uprising with the Light of the Newspapers and the International Reports 
People started to learn about the meeting in the Babur Square from their friends, 
neighbors, and drivers while going to work. According to an interview of ODIHR (Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) with the refugees who left Andijan on May 13, 
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people were talking about their problems.86 About 10,000 people came together; some attendees 
argued it was approximately 30,000. There were peaceful protestors without weapons, including 
women and children.87 Military forces started to shoot the protestors around 7 a.m. After that 
time, a different group of soldiers opened fire from time to time at a different part of the square.88 
However, instead of splitting apart, people gathered in the square since they believed Islam 
Karimov would come to listen to them and their problems. However, nobody came, and instead, 
around 5 p.m., heavy trucks covered all around the square and started to fire on the people, even 
journalists were under the fire.89 The mass of people dispersed from the square, some of them 
walked to the Kyrgyz border, approximately 30 kilometers far from Andijan (around 18.61 
miles).90 Nearly 540 immigrants reached Kyrgyzstan.91 
According to some eyewitnesses in the square on May 13, there were no ambulances in 
the square to help the wounded the whole night. Instead, some soldiers killed the wounded. On 
the morning of May 14th, Karimov declared that Islamic extremists were responsible for the 
violence the previous night.92 They aimed to capture Andijan, and they did not come to the 
square as protestors.93 An investigation by Human Rights Watch in Andijan, did not find any 
proof that shows prison attackers and protestors in the square were encouraged by the 
fundamentalist groups.94 Also, Hizb ut-Tahrir denied the accusation of Karimov. The 
organization’s London office stated that because of Karimov’s corruption and pressure, civilians 
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could not stand him, and the Andijan event was a product of this.95 During the Soviet period, the 
secularization of the states come to the forefront, and it affects the present structure of 
Uzbekistan. Today, support for radical Islamists groups is dwindling in Uzbekistan. However, 
economic problems and bribery have forced the hand of citizens to protest.96 Therefore, people 
joined the meeting to talk about their issues. There was a microphone in the square to mention 
their economic problems to the masses.97 Expecting to see a government representative to 
address them, they were met with overpowering military force.  
In the morning of May 14, eyewitnesses said that the authorities collected the bodies in a 
school, a college and local parks as makeshift morgues, and Babur Square too. People come to 
find their relatives.98 According to a doctor who was working in the morgue of the city said that 
at least 500 rebels were killed. Survivors stated the government shot them like rabbits. However, 
Karimov claimed that he did not give an order to shoot people.99  
The uprising started in Andijan and moved to Qarasuv (Karasu) (a small town which 
bordered on Kyrgyzstan) and shifted to Pakhtabad (about 30 far away from Andijan).100 Angry 
people came to the Qarasuv and took the Mayor as a hostage. Later, they rebuilt the bridge of the 
Shakhrikhansay river, which is very important for the trade with the Kyrgyzstan. Bakhtiyor 
Rahimov was the responsible for that action; it appears that his main aim was re-establishing the 
trade connection with Kyrgyzstan.101 The public started to shout slogans in the village of Karasu 
(Korasuv), such as: “Karimov, give the public a job,” “The last of the bullshit (Zorbaliga son),” 
                                                 
95 “Isyan Guclenerek Geri Donecek,” Ortadogu, (16 May 2005) 
96 ICG Asia Report, Uzbekistan: The Andijon, 7-8. 
97 BBC News, “How The Andijan Killings Unfolded,” 
98Galima Bukharbaeva, “No Requiem for The Dead,” Institute for War&Peace Reporting, (16 May 2005) Accessed 
November 21, 2017.  https://iwpr.net/global-voices/no-requiem-dead  
99 Nerdun Hacioglu, “Bizi Tavsan Gibi Vurdular,” Hurriyet, (16 May 2005). 16. 
100 Ilya Graschenkov, “против режима каримова бунтуют города,” Novoye Russkoye Slovo, (17 May 2005) 
101 ICG Asia Report, Uzbekistan: The Andijon, 5-6. 
 23 
“Don’t kill your people.”102 The Karasuv uprising was over on the morning of May 19th with the 
arrest of Rahimov and others.103 
The Boston Globe emphasized human rights groups reports which mentioned the massive 
violence of the government. Also, the newspaper is included White House spokesman Scott 
McClellans statement:” We have had a concern about human rights in Uzbekistan, but we are 
concerned about human rights in Uzbekistan, but we are concerned about the outbreak of 
violence.”104 In another speech Scott McClellan highlighted that Uzbeks want to have a more 
democratic administration.105  
A Russian analyst, Yulia Latynina, commented the uprising ”This was not an extremist 
revolt, but simply a revolt by desperate Muslims, who above all wanted to free their relatives 
from prison.”106  
Craig Murray, who was the British ambassador in Tashkent remarked that the protestors 
in Andijan don’t want to create a radical Islamist regime in Uzbekistan, they want to get 
democracy, and possibly more Islamic influence over governance. However, he stated that it is 
not like the Taliban, it looks more like Turkey.107 So, it means that their aim was not to attack the 
secular regime as the state declared, rather they wanted to have greater freedom for their 
religious life.  
As Prof. Dr. Ahat Andican highlighted, there was no influential opposition group in 
Uzbekistan. Therefore, the uprising could not spread to all districts in Uzbekistan. It was only at 
                                                 
102 Nerdun Hacioglu, “Halk da Ayaklandi,”  
103 ICG Asia Report, Uzbekistan: The Andijon, 5-6. 
104 Bukharbayeva, 12 Killed, A6. 
105 Vladimir Kozlovsky, “Андижан и Вашингтон,” Novoye Russkoye Slova, (16 May 2005) 7. 
106Anna Dolgov, “Poverty, Crime, and Oppression seen as fueling Uzbek’s Anger,” The Boston Globe, (17 May 
2005) A10.  
107 Kozlovsky, Андижан, 7. 
 24 
the local level.108 After twelve years since Andijan events, it can be said that some respected 
businessmen created an Islamic charity in Uzbekistan. They were arrested on suspicion of being 
fundamentalists. After their trial, their friends, family and beneficiaries revolted since there was 
no verdict in the trial, and the public joined them. Firstly, the uprising started for the 23 
businessmen’s trial but, after civilians attended them, it converted to the rebellion for the 
economic and social problems in Uzbekistan. Because Karimov was a powerful president, who 
did not want to lose his power, he declared these protestors as terrorists and, put down the 
uprising with the bloody way.  
After these events, an international investigation was started. However, Russia and China 
were against that research. With influence over them, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
accepted the Andijan event as ‘a terrorist plot.’ Thus, the investigation was not successful.109 
After twelve years from the Andijan uprising, still, there are some restrictions of the 
regime. Being a devout Muslim and being an extremist, radical Islamist is not apparent. Also, 
there is no definite evidence to show increasing radical movements and treating the regime in 
Uzbekistan.110 After the death of Islam Karimov, the new president Shavkat Mirziyoyev declared 
2017 as “Year of Dialogue with the People and Human Interest.”111 It is too early to say 
something about the new President of Uzbekistan. However, it can be expected that Shavkat 
Mirziyoyev realizes the necessity of religious freedom in the country and gives the public more 
religious freedom, and by doing so, radical movements will expire in Uzbekistan. 
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Conclusion 
Looking at the place of Islam at the governmental level, it could be seen that, as a 
successor of SADUM, the muftiate system, ensures the control of the mosques, religious 
institutes, and Muslim religious leaders in Uzbekistan. Also, with the help of the law “Freedom 
of Conscience and Religious Organizations” (1998) the pattern of secularism in Uzbekistan is 
guaranteed. Although this law shows the equality of citizens’ religious beliefs, it also brings 
many restrictions for those who want to be practicing Muslims. In conclusion, obtaining 
religious knowledge without approval of the government has been regulated and restricted. 
Beyond the legal structure, all the religious activity is called “unofficial” Islam. This thesis 
clarifies the governmental approach to Islam in terms of not only radical movements (IMU, HT) 
but also, devout Muslims with the aim of making apparent the relationship between Islam and 
the state. 
Since the regime wants to maintain its autocratic rule and sees any uprising as a threat to 
the regime, radical Islam seems to be a useful tool and the Andijan uprising was no exception. 
Even though the government arresting 23 businessmen appeared to eliminate radical Islam or 
provide a temporary fix, in reality, it aimed to constrain opposition. These businessmen were 
respectful people who were trying to help others under the Islamic charity. The government 
arrested them, and their journey to a verdict took so much time which forced people to attack the 
prison and to save businessmen, and finally to organize an uprising. Although, it is not 
acceptable attacking the prison and using violence to save the businessmen, to call the uprising 
as a radical Islamist attack is not be accurate since there were many people joined the uprising, 
ranging from economic instability to social discomfort.  
 26 
This thesis shows that the 2005 Andijan uprising was organized by radical Islamists to 
defend the businessmen’s rights. With contributions by local people who wanted to find a 
solution to their economic and social problems it became a significant protest to show the unrest 
of citizens. So, to call the uprising a radical Islamist attack to demolish secular regime needs 
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